Abstract-Mobile-hierarchy architecture was widely adopted for query a deployed wireless sensor network in an intelligent transportation system recently. Secure handshake among mobile node and ordinary nodes becomes an important part of an intelligent transportation system. For dividing virtual communication area, pre-negotiation should be conducted between mobile node and ordinary node before formal handshake. Pre-negotiation among nodes can increase the odds for a successful handshake. The mobile node negotiates with an ordinary sensor node over an insecure communication channel by private set intersection. As an important handshake factor, Attribute set is negotiated privately among them in local side. In this paper, a secure handshake scheme with pre-negotiation for mobile-hierarchy city intelligent transportation system under semi-honest model is proposed.
cooperative multi-agent based principled negotiation between agents [2] . Ahmed et al. and Bachmann et al. discussed a practical traffic and transportation problem as a data fusion problem [3, 4] . Various significant contributions were made to the field of data fusion in transportation systems [5] . If two sensor nodes have the same current state attributes, it is possible for them to perform data fusion, provide mutual support. Secret handshake was introduced recently by Balfanz et al. and Su et al. [6, 7] , it is a useful cryptographic mechanism which allows two members of the same group to authenticate each other secretly. Therefore, secret handshake concept can certainly be applied to mobile-hierarchy city intelligent transportation system to achieve secure attribute matching. Homomorphic encryptions allow complex mathematical operations to be performed on encrypted data without compromising the encryption. In mathematics, homomorphic describes the transformation of one data set into another while preserving relationships between elements in both sets [8] . In this paper, we present a secure attribute matching handshake scheme with pre-negotiation based on bilinear pairings and private set intersection which can be used to extend fuzzy authentication and data fusion by intersecting set elements and matching attributes privately [9] .
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the preliminaries. The proposed scheme is described in Section III. The security analysis is given in Section IV. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear maps
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G 1 and e be a bilinear map, e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 . The bilinear map e has the following properties:
Bilinearity: for all g 1 , g 2 G 1 and a, b Z p , we have e(g 1 a , g 2 b ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) ab . Non-degeneracy: e(g, g)≠1.
We say that G 1 is a bilinear group if the group operation in G 1 and the bilinear map e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 are both efficiently computable. Notice that the map e is symmetric since e(g a , g b ) = e(g,g) ab = e(g b , g a ).
B. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. a bilinear map e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 and a generator g of G 1 , The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) in (G 1 , G 2 , e) is that no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B can distinguish e(g,g)
abc given (g a , g b , g c ) from an element e(g,g)
z with more than a negligible advantage Adv. We define the advantage of a distinguisher against the DBDH as follows: C. Semi-honest model A semi-honest party is one who follows the prescribed actions in the protocol with the exception that it keeps all its intermediate computations.
All parties may record all message from the protocol execution and try to compute as much as possible in the protocol, and perform any additional polynomial-time computation apart from the prescribed protocol. We adopt the standard definition from Brickell and shmatikov's scheme [10] . D(E(m 1 ,r 1 ) · E(m 2 ,r 2 )mod n 2 )=m 1 +m 2 mod n The product of a ciphertext E(m 1 ,r 1 ) with a plaintext g m2 raising g will decrypt to the sum of the corresponding plaintexts (m 1 ,m 2 ).
D(E(m 1 ,r 1 ) · g m2 mod n 2 )=m 1 +m 2 mod n An encrypted plaintext E(m 1 ,r 1 )/ E(m 2 ,r 2 ) raised to the power of another plaintext m 2 /m 1 will decrypt to the product of the two plaintexts (m 1 ,m 2 ),
m1 mod n 2 )=m 1 m 2 mod n An encrypted plaintext E(m 1 ,r 1 ) raised to a constant k will decrypt to the product of the plaintext m 1 and the constant k, D(E(m 1 ,r 1 ) k mod n 2 )=km 1 mod n III. PROPOSED SCHEME It is assumed that there is a trust third party.The mobile node group require a public/private key pair (PK si },SK si ) for Paillier encryption and digital signatures. We notate digital signatures of message x as Sign (x). The trust third party run the setup algorithm to obtain (p, q, r, G, G T , e) with G=G p ×G q ×G r . Here, G p , G q , G r denotes the subgroups of G having order p, q, and r, respectively. Observe that G=G p ×G q ×G r . If g is a generator of G, then the element g pq is a generator of G r ; the element g pr is a generator of G q ; and the element g qr is a generator of G p . 
A. Pre-negotiation
The mobile node A with attribute set X=(x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x k ) and ordinary node B with attribute set Y=(y 1 ,y 2 ,…,y k ). Both X and Y are drawn from some common domain. A computes a polynomial f(y)=(y-x 1 )(y-x 2 )…(y-
of degree k with roots x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x k and sends B encrypted coefficients, Enc(α 1 ), Enc(α 2 ),…, Enc(α k ). B evaluates A's polynomial at each point y in his dataset through computing Enc(r·f(y)+y) with a random number r for each y. When A decrypts the ciphertexts, A gets the value of the corresponding elements for each of the elements in X∩Y, whereas the result is random for all other values. B computes a polynomial f(x)=(x-y 1 )(x-y 2 )…(x-
of degree k with roots y 1 ,y 2 ,…,y k and sends A encrypted coefficients, Enc(β 1 ), Enc(β 2 ),…, Enc(β k ). A evaluates B's polynomial at each point x in his dataset through computing Enc(r·f(x)+x) with a random number r for each x. When B decrypts the ciphertexts, B gets the value of the corresponding elements for each of the elements in X∩Y, whereas the result is random for all other values.
B. Handshake
Next, it computes g p , g q ,and g r as generateors of G p , G q , G r , respectively. It then chooses R 1,i , R 2,i •G r and h 1,i ,h 2,i •G p uniformly at random for i=1 to n, and R 0 •G r uniformly at random. The public parameters include (N=pgr, G, G T , e) along with:
The 
The trust third party generate attributes vector for user v i =(A 1 ,……,A n ), and recall SK (
The trust third party define host v i 's attributes match user x i 's policy as v i· x i =(A 1 ,……,A n ) · (p 1 ,……,p n )=0.
When user A x i communicates with user B v i , user v i show their SK vi to x i , x i will compute equation: 
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e g h h e h g g g e R R R g g e h g g g e R R R g g Assume that the mobile agent with attribute set X=(x 1 ,x 2 ,…,x k ) and ordinary node B with attribute set Y=(y 1 ,y 2 ,…,y k ). After pre-negotiation, A and B learns nothing more than the elements of X∩Y.
Proof. of Correctness: Given the encrypted coefficients Enc(α 1 ), Enc(α 2 ),…, Enc(α k ) of the polynomial f(y), B computes Enc(r·f(y)+y), uses the homomorphic properties of the encryption system to evaluate the polynomial at each elements of A's elements. B decrypts the ciphertexts. For each of the elements in X∩Y, the result of this decryption is the value of the corresponding elements, whereas the result is random for all other values. The procedure is same for B.
A and B's privacy: Assume that the proof defines a
operates in the real model, there is a B* operating in the real model. B sends to A encrypted coefficients Enc(β 1 ), Enc(β 2 ),…, Enc(β k ). B* sends to A coefficients β* 1 ,β* 2 ,…, β* k , the k roots of this polynomial are the inputs that B* sends to the trusted third party in the ideal implementation, such that for every input Enc(r·f(x)+x) of A, the views of the party B*, A in the real model is indistinguishable from the views of B, A in the real model. The standard definition of security in the static semi-honest model refers to Section II.
Assume that the length of the prime number p is 512,1024, 1536 bits in modular exponentiation, The protocol is implemented in C using MIRACL library and server configuration: Microsoft Windows xp Professional 2002 Service Pack 3, Intel(R) Core(TM), CPU 2.53 GHz, 3.98 GB of RAM [11] . The average time for computing a single modular exponentiation is 0.9 ms for 512-bit, 6ms for 1024-bit, and 28ms for 1536-bit module. According to average time for computing a single modular exponentiation, it is observed that the proposals computation time is effective.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a secure attribute matching handshake scheme with pre-negotiation which employs attributes to describe policy and achieves the fuzzy authentication and data fusion is proposed. The proposed scheme adopts private set intersection for pre-negotiation, and adopts attribute encryption to implement an attribute matching procedure. It provides a balance between confidentiality and availability. According to security analysis, it satisfies the correctness and privacy requirements. Furthermore, it laid a solid foundation for private negotiation among sensor agents and give a self protect for each agent. In the future, a s attribute matching handshake scheme with pre-negotiation under the malicious model will be considered. 
